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Strange Bedfellows: How an Anticipatory
Countermovement Brought Same-Sex
Marriage into the Public Arena
Michael C. Dorf and Sidney Tarrow
Since the 1980s, social movement scholars have investigated the dynamic of
movement/countermovement interaction. Most of these studies posit movements as ini-
tiators, with countermovements reacting to their challenges. Yet sometimes a movement
supports an agenda in response to a countermovement that engages in what we call
“anticipatory countermobilization.” We interviewed ten leading LGBT activists to
explore the hypothesis that the LGBT movement was brought to the fight for marriage
equality by the anticipatory countermobilization of social conservatives who opposed
same-sex marriage before there was a realistic prospect that it would be recognized by the
courts or political actors. Our findings reinforce the existing scholarship, but also go
beyond it in emphasizing a triangular relationship among social movement organizations,
countermovement organizations, and grassroots supporters of same-sex marriage. More
broadly, the evidence suggests the need for a more reciprocal understanding of the relations
among movements, countermovements, and sociolegal change.
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars have long appreciated that social movements drive much legal
change (Scheingold 1974; McCann 1994, 2006; Eskridge 2001; Siegel 2008; Balkin
2011). At the same time, social movement scholars are increasingly aware of the law as
part of the “opportunity structure” of movement activists (Hilson 2002; Boutcher 2010,
2013; Hajjar 2010; Prabhat 2011; de Fazio 2012; Vanhala 2012; Boutcher and Stobaugh
2013). Our work brings together social movement and legal scholarship to trace the
dynamic relationship between an anticipatory countermobilization, a movement
response, and the role of grassroots activists in triggering this response.
Although many scholars have recognized the role of countermovements, theoreti-
cal understandings of the relationship among law and social movements remain one-
sided. In particular, little is known about the reciprocal relations between movements
and countermovements in legal and political opportunity structures. This article
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examines in detail one dramatic change: the adoption of legal same-sex marriage as a
policy goal by the LGBT rights advocacy community over the last two decades in the
wake of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA 1996) and the wave of state-level
constitutional amendments and mini DOMAs that followed. These policy changes
were in large part the result of what we call the “anticipatory countermobilization” of a
religious conservative countermovement prior to the determination of the LGBT com-
munity to mobilize on behalf of marriage equality.
We tell a story of strange bedfellows: we argue that it was not the gay and lesbian
community that moved the issue of marriage equality to the top of the social policy
agenda, but an archipelago of Christian conservative and “family values” groups
responding to court rulings and legislation that were less threatening to traditional
values than marriage equality was (Klarman 2012, 48–85; Stone 2012). By doing so,
they reversed the commonly understood sequence of movement/countermovement
interaction, whereby a movement for change triggers a countermovement that seeks to
roll back policies advanced by those with whom they disagree. In this case it was the
countermovement—by lobbying for the passage of laws and state initiatives preventing
same-sex marriage—that launched the dynamic that led to the campaign for, and the
growing approval of, same-sex marriage that we have seen in the past decade.
Our work supports the existing scholarship (as we explain below), but also goes
beyond it in emphasizing a dynamic triangular relationship among social movement
organizations, countermovement organizations, and grassroots supporters of same-sex
marriage. We argue that DOMA and state initiatives triggered a “cycle of contention”
that mobilized LGBT everyday activists to urge movement organizations to take up the
cause of same-sex marriage. Ours is neither an elite nor a mass explanation of policy
change, but an interactive model of elite-mass and movement-countermovement
interaction.
Until about the mid-1990s, marriage was not a high priority for the LGBT move-
ment. This was in part because there were many other issues to address, but also because
of fear of overreaching in a country in which the majority’s religious beliefs militated
against approval of same-sex marriage. However, the religious right had no such qualms:
“Religious right activists,” writes Tina Fetner, “saw their opposition to same-sex marriage
as an issue with strong cultural resonance and popular support” (2008, 110–11). They
claimed that developments like the passage of local ordinances against discrimination
would be the entering wedge for the legalization of same-sex marriage and, ultimately, for
the destruction of the American family. Only in response to their efforts to ban same-sex
marriage did the LGBT movement vigorously take up the question of marriage.
It is not news that movements for change produce countermovements against
them, seeking stability or a rollback of the policies of which they disapprove. In a
general sense, this was the case from the 1960s on, when movements for personal and
group rights helped trigger a cultural countermovement in US politics, but in the
particular case of same-sex marriage, it was the conservative countermovement that
initiated this particular cycle of contention, not the LGBT movement itself.
But what was the “movement” and what was the “countermovement”? Along with
most scholars of contentious politics, we define a movement as a group of actors who seek
to change the legal and/or social status quo and a countermovement as those who seek to
preserve the status quo or to roll back recent changes to the status quo (della Porta and Diani
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1999; Tilly 2004; Meyer, Jenness, and Ingram 2005; Tarrow 2011). To be sure, move-
ments and countermovements exist in a dialectical relationship and thus in some sense
the actors who initiate any particular cycle of contention may be understood as the
“movement,” while those who respond may be cast in the role of “countermovement.”
In the present context, it might be said that a “movement” of social conservatives
placed the issue of same-sex marriage on the public agenda and that an LGBT rights
“countermovement” sought to counter the former’s efforts, but this formulation would
confusingly invert the relationship between actors seeking social change and those who
seek to reverse it.
We recognize an inevitable imprecision in these definitions. Since Heraclitus,
philosophers and others have known that there is no truly stable status quo, and thus,
ultimately, there can be no preservation of the status quo. Moreover, some nominally
reactionary movements aim to “return” to a fictive past. Nonetheless, we regard the
distinction between those who seek change and those who oppose it as important, in
the context of same-sex marriage and other movements for legal and social reform. By
drawing the line between movements and countermovements where we do, we high-
light the natural expectation that movements—those who seek legal and/or social
change—would generally be the ones to initiate cycles of contentious politics, whereas
countermovements would generally be in the reactive role. And yet, that general
pattern was not followed with respect to same-sex marriage.
The dynamic of a cycle of contention initiated by a countermovement has been
recognized by other scholars who have worked on sexual politics (see Meyer and
Staggenborg 1996, 1998; Fetner 2008; Klarman 2012; Stone 2012, 2013; Weiss 2013). As
Tina Fetner writes: “Leaders in the religious right may have thought the issue of marriage
would be an easy victory, given how important the symbolic aspects of marriage are to
many people” (2008, 112). And, indeed, through the first decade of this century, the
religious right won most of the electoral battles it began (Stone 2012, ch. 5).
However, this movement/countermovement dynamic did not remain at the elite
level of the “social movement organization”: in the cycle of contention leading to the
(thus-far-still-partial) success of the same-sex marriage movement, we found that
ordinary gay and lesbian couples who had been creating lives for themselves at the
grassroots put pressure on LGBT advocacy groups, pushing them to place marriage
equality high on their agendas when conservative forces began to win public policy
battles on the issue of same-sex marriage. In this article, we argue, first, that changes
in the political opportunity structure drove the dynamic of same-sex marriage;
second, that the strategic move of the anti-same-sex marriage lobby, passing anti-
same-sex marriage laws at both the federal and state levels, triggered a reluctant
LGBT movement to take action; and, third, that the decision to respond to the
religious right’s challenge was activated by a grassroots mobilization of gay and lesbian
couples, many of whom had been previously politically inactive in the movement.
What largely began as a duel between movement organizations and countermove-
ment organizations expanded into a triangular relationship involving everyday activ-
ists that helped nudge LGBT movement organizations into a commitment to
marriage equality and thus to its dramatic recent successes. In closing, we summarize
research by other scholars that reinforces the role of elite-mass interaction within the
LGBT community.
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Tina Fetner’s book is the most relevant to the story we wish to analyze. Like Meyer
and Staggenborg, Fetner showed how each opposing movement became part of the
political and legal opportunity structure of the other, how they selectively used venues
that would provide them with the best advantage, and how particular events either
helped them mobilize a following or forced them to shift their attention to another
venue.1 But unlike Meyer and Staggenborg, Fetner (2008, 110–14) showed how a
countermovement can put an issue on the agenda that the movement it opposes would
not—on its own—have chosen to focus on. Fetner (112) showed that “this issue has
also mobilized the lesbian and gay movement in response, including many lesbian and
gay people who had not previously been involved in activism.”
Beyond the existing literature, the evidence for our argument comes from our own
observations and a unique set of qualitative interviews we carried out in 2012 with
prominent LGBT rights advocates and attorneys. These interviewees served both as
respondents about their own roles in the process of movement/countermovement
interaction and as informants about the general processes we examine. We begin in Part
II with the theory of movement/countermovement dynamics as it has developed among
students of social movements because we think this is an underexploited resource
within legal scholarship. We then turn in Part III to a legal/political analysis of the case
law that contributed to the changing opportunity structure for the LGBT movement,
which is poorly understood by social movement scholars. In Part IV, we summarize what
happened and, in general terms, propose why these changes occurred when they did. In
Part V, we draw on our informant data to provide rich qualitative evidence for our
hypotheses. In Part VI, we explore how our findings fit with evidence from the research
of others whose work resonates with our findings.
II. THE THEORY OF MOVEMENT/COUNTERMOVEMENT
INTERACTION
In the 1980s, sociologists and political scientists began to pay attention to the
interaction of movements and countermovements in episodes of contentious politics.
The first to give equal importance to these interactions was sociologist Doug McAdam
in his landmark 1983 article, “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency.”
McAdam had noticed that each time the authorities reacted to the civil rights move-
ment’s sit-ins, marches, and civil disobedience, the movement reacted with an inno-
vation in its tactics. This dynamic kept the movement one step ahead of its antagonists
and kept the attention of the media and of national political groups focused on its
struggle.
Like most scholars of movement/countermovement interaction, McAdam
regarded movements seeking to change the status quo as the beginning of cycles of
movement/countermovement interaction. Indeed, it is the desire to change the status
quo that defines a movement as a movement. By contrast, in the conventional narrative,
1. For example, Fetner describes the importance of Anita Bryant’s antigay campaign in Florida for the
gay and lesbian movement as well as the Roe v. Wade decision for the pro-life movement (2008, 25–39).
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countermovements are groups that mobilize against changes proposed by such move-
ments. Thus, Clarence Lo (1982) and Meyer Zald and Bert Useem (1987) focused on
countermovements’ dependence on and reaction to an initiating movement, whether of
the right or the left. They also argued that movements trigger reactions from rival
countermovements. Zald and Useem characterized the resulting relationship as a
“loosely coupled tango of mobilization and countermobilization in which the state can
sometimes intervene on behalf of one side or the other” (Zald and Useem 1987,
252–53).2
But countermovements against legal and/or social change sometimes initiate cycles
of contention too, challenging change movements to respond to their efforts. Because
they argue for the status quo, countermovements initially achieve more success in the
policy arena than do movements for social and/or legal change, which need to over-
come inertia. But the successes of “anticipatory countermobilization” are often tempo-
rary because they can trigger social movements to mobilize against them, as we will
show below and will argue more generally in our conclusions.
Sexual Politics
A significant volume of research on movement/countermovement interaction has
dealt with sexual politics. In two closely reasoned articles, David S. Meyer and Suzanne
Staggenborg (1996, 1998) wrote about movement/countermovement interaction in
conflicts over abortion.3 Meyer and Staggenborg articulated the central role of “political
opportunity structure” in the relationship between opposing groups. They specified
three conditions leading to the emergence of countermovements: first, signs of success
of the original movement; second, the perceived threat to some population as the result
of this success; and third, the availability of influential allies to aid in oppositional
mobilization (1996, 1635–43).
2. Since Zald and Useem’s and Meyer and Staggenborg’s foundational studies, a number of other
scholars have advanced our knowledge of movement/countermovement interaction in various sectors of
public life. In the civil rights field, Kenneth Andrews showed how white citizens’ councils in the South
responded to the successes of the civil rights movement by creating “white flight” schools (2002); in case
studies involving natural resources and animal exploitation, Andrew Austin (2002) has worked on the
antienvironmental countermovement; Anders Blok (2008) has analyzed Japanese pro-whaling
countermobilization and Lyle Munro (1999) has examined campaigns against animal liberation; in labor
conflicts, Marc Dixon (2008) has analyzed right-to-work activism; in the Middle East, Samuel Peleg (2000)
has explored how Israeli peace activists and settlers stimulated and motivated one another, while Alimi and
Hirsch-Hoefler (2012) examined the interaction between Israeli settlers and Palestinians during the first
Intifada; and in a study of antislavery, Art Budros (2011) has shown the contentious interaction between the
Society of Friends and the Dutch Reformed Church in the revolutionary period in the United States.
3. In addition to the foundational work of Meyer and Staggenborg, important markers have been
articles by Jocelyn Crowley (2009) on fathers’ rights; Dina Rohlinger (2002) on the abortion debate; and
especially by Tina Fetner (2008) and Amy Stone (2012) with respect to the LGBT rights movement. Stone’s
recent book focuses on how the extensive use of referenda and initiatives by the Christian right put the
LGBT movement at a severe disadvantage, displacing resources from court and legislative strategies, but
forcing the movement to develop electoral techniques it previously lacked (2012). At the same time, in
response to defeats at the ballot box—like California’s Proposition 8—LGBT activists developed a range of
“cultural” protests that put their movement in a media spotlight and forwarded the cause of same-sex
marriage among the public (see Taylor et al. 2009; Bernstein and Taylor 2013).
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It was with respect to the interaction between movements and countermovements
that their theory was most original: their key insight was that movements and coun-
termovements become part of the political and legal opportunity structure of each other
(Meyer and Staggenborg 1996, 1647). But both political and legal opportunity struc-
tures are capacious concepts:4 which aspects of the opportunity structure are most likely
to trigger a movement/countermovement interaction? Political power in the United
States is highly fragmented. Separation of powers in the national government can
frustrate a winning coalition’s ability to translate electoral victory into legislation and
much power resides in state and local governments. In such a system, movements or
countermovements can shift the scale of the conflict or change venues when they suffer
defeats (1648). Both federalism and separation of powers offer movements and coun-
termovements a number of different venues in which to maintain their struggle (Meyer
and Staggenborg 1998). Part of the dynamic we examine includes the strategic shift in
scale of one actor or another from one level of the political system to another, and
between the courts and the electoral system.
Stages of the Interaction Cycle
We specify three critical aspects of the “movement/countermovement” interaction
cycle.
First, and most generally, we see changes in the political and legal opportunity
structure as largely responsible for shaping the interaction between the marriage equal-
ity and the traditional marriage forces.
Second, we initially see what we call “anticipatory countermobilization” on the part
of the latter, leading to policy changes that led the LGBT movement to respond.
Third, we see grassroots pressure on that movement as partly or even largely
responsible for pushing it toward a vigorous, and ultimately successful, campaign against
the countermovement.
III. THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LAW
The legal struggle over same-sex marriage did not begin with DOMA: a same-sex
marriage case from Minnesota made it to the US Supreme Court as early as 1972, but
it was treated by the justices as a curiosity not worthy of comment (Baker v. Nelson).
The first serious debates about same-sex marriage came in the State of Hawaii when, in
1991, three same-sex couples sued the state on the basis of the state’s constitutional
provision guaranteeing equal protection (Baehr v. Lewin 1993). The case was sent back
to a lower court, but before that court could rule on the constitutional issue, the state
4. Political opportunity structure is a concept that has mainly been developed by scholars such as Peter
Eisinger (1973), Doug McAdam (1999), Hanspeter Kriesi (1995), and Sidney Tarrow (2011). For an analysis
of the static and dynamic specifications of this concept, see Gamson and Meyer (1996) and Tarrow (2011).
The specifically legal forms of opportunity structure have been analyzed by Andersen (2005), Boutcher
(2013), de Fazio (2012), Hilson (2002), McCann (1994), Prabhat (2011), and Vanhala (2012).
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legislature passed a new law limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples and the voters
amended their constitution to make clear that the legislature had the right to impose
such a law (Fetner 2008, 110–11). So it would remain in Hawaii until the state’s
governor signed a bill that would make same-sex marriage legal beginning in December
2013.
Although Baehr excited LGBT activists all over the country, it was not the result
of an organized campaign by the mainstream of the LGBT movement, which had,
thus far, put marriage on the back burner of its concerns. But it sowed panic among
social conservatives, who worried that—if same-sex marriage became legal in
Hawaii—the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the US Constitution would require
other states to recognize same-sex marriages from across the Pacific (Gerstmann 2008,
67, 197; Stone 2012, 31). Baehr was the trigger for the religious right to push for
passage of state and national legislation declaring marriage to be “between one man
and one woman.” It was mainly in response to this strategy that the US Congress, in
1996, passed DOMA. The national DOMA was followed by the passage of fifteen
state-level DOMAs in 1995 and 1996. These state-wide laws were successful, not only
in freezing progress in LGBT rights, but also in rallying conservatives and dividing
liberal legislators—who mainly supported these laws, as did President Clinton with
DOMA—from their gay constituents (Stone 2012, 31). To this point, the initiative
mainly seemed to lie with the countermovement, while the LGBT movement
seemed unable to adapt to the right’s strategy of using popular referenda to advance
its goals.
To be sure, same-sex marriage advocates scored a partial victory in 1999 when the
Vermont Supreme Court invalidated that state’s opposite-sex-marriage-only law (Baker
v. State). But even though the movement had carefully prepared the ground before filing
suit (Klarman 2012, 75), the remedy was only partial: the Vermont legislature was given
the choice of legalizing same-sex marriage or civil unions (Eskridge 2002), and after
legislators opted for the lesser status of civil unions, they faced a backlash from voters
who thought that even this went too far (Klarman 2012, 77–83). The LGBT rights
movement was once again thrown on the defensive.
The initiative began to shift with a decision of the Supreme Court in 2003. In
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court invalidated a Texas criminal statute that forbade sodomy
(but only when performed by people of the same sex). Justice Anthony Kennedy’s
Lawrence opinion, like his 1996 opinion in the Court’s first pro-gay-rights ruling, Romer
v. Evans, was a landmark success for the LGBT movement. Kennedy’s opinion in Romer
did not say that discrimination against gays and lesbians was presumptively unconsti-
tutional in the way that race discrimination is, but it did condemn the “animus” that the
Court saw as motivating the decision of Colorado voters to strip gays and lesbians of the
modest protection against discrimination that local ordinances had provided. Likewise
in Lawrence, Kennedy did not expressly say that same-sex intimacy was a fundamental
right akin to freedom of speech or even contraception but here, too, he left little doubt
where his (and the Court’s) sympathies lay. At the same time, however, Kennedy
signaled that the Court was not quite ready to say that the Constitution protects a right
to same-sex marriage. He pointedly noted that the case did “not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter” (Lawrence, p. 578).
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Not everybody took the hint. Later that year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court relied on Lawrence’s logic, rather than on Kennedy’s disclaimer, to find a right to
same-sex marriage in the Bay State’s Constitution (Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health). For the first time in US history, a state’s law gave recognition to same-sex
marriage, not just to civil unions. The alarm that had been sounded by social conser-
vatives in response to the Hawaii Supreme Court’s civil union ruling a decade earlier
had proven premature, but not unjustified.
Beginning in the middle of the decade, the debate over civil unions and same-sex
marriage appeared to galvanize public opinion and especially LGBT activist groups. The
result was that civil unions were largely left behind as the refuge of fence-straddling
politicians. Three state courts followed the example of Massachusetts by finding a right
to same-sex marriage under their state constitutions: California and Connecticut in
2008 (In re Marriage Cases; Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health) and Iowa in 2009
(Varnum v. Brien). Meanwhile, same-sex marriage was made legal by legislation in four
other states—Maine and Vermont in 2009; New Hampshire in 2010; and New York in
2011—and in the District of Columbia in 2010.
Not all those changes stuck, however. Referenda reversed the positive results in
California and Maine, while Iowa voters’ rejection of the justices who voted to legalize
same-sex marriage left such marriages in that state in a precarious position. The
California referendum, “Proposition 8,” was then overturned by a lower court in Perry
v. Schwarzenegger (2010), a ruling that the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed on narrow grounds (Perry v. Brown 2012). The US Supreme Court then held
that the state’s refusal to defend Proposition 8 had rendered the appeals court without
jurisdiction, which had the effect of leaving in place the district court ruling (Hollings-
worth v. Perry 2013).
On the same day that it unofficially invalidated Proposition 8, a different majority
of the Supreme Court also officially invalidated the section of DOMA that defined
marriage as opposite-sex marriage for federal purposes. Justice Kennedy wrote for the
Court once again and once again he sent a somewhat mixed signal. Although his
analysis spoke eloquently of the equal dignity to which same-sex couples are entitled,
his opinion also heralded the traditional power of the states with respect to defining
marriage (United States v. Windsor 2013). Paired with the procedural nonruling in the
Proposition 8 case, the Court’s opinion with respect to DOMA indicated that while a
majority of the justices were sympathetic to the cause of same-sex marriage, they were
not yet ready to guarantee a nationwide right to it.
The year 2013 was a remarkable one for same-sex marriage in the states as well. On
January 1, same-sex marriage became legal in Maryland, as a result of changes approved
in 2012. Rhode Island, Delaware, Minnesota, Hawaii, and Illinois all followed with
marriage equality statutes of their own, although the Illinois law does not go into effect
until the middle of 2014. Two federal district court rulings in late December 2013
expanded legalized same-sex marriage, at least pending appellate consideration. On the
strength of the reasoning in the Windsor case, one judge ruled that Ohio was obligated
to recognize same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions (Obergefell v. Wymyslo), while
another judge invalidated Utah’s same-sex marriage ban (Kitchen v. Herbert).
Meanwhile, court rulings catalyzed executive action in the states. Following
Hollingsworth, California state officials announced that they would treat Proposition 8 as
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a nullity and the most populous state in the union once again fully recognized same-sex
marriages. In New Jersey, Republican Governor Chris Christie dropped his appeal of a
state court ruling requiring full marriage equality after the state supreme court refused to
stay the judgment pending appeal (Garden State Equality v. Dow).
In the meantime, the advantage on this issue that the socially conservative coun-
termovement held in the electorate began to evaporate: in November 2012, for the first
time ever, same-sex marriage was approved when put to a direct vote of the people.
Referenda supporting same-sex marriage passed in Maryland, Washington, and Maine
(where voters repudiated their 2009 ballot initiative), while Minnesota voters defeated
a ballot initiative that would have written opposition to same-sex marriage into the
state’s constitution.
Political elites—reading the tea leaves of the polls, but also under pressure from
politically astute LGBT advocates—soon began to favor legalizing same-sex marriage.
Consider the “evolution” of President Barack Obama. As early as 1996, when running
for the Illinois Senate, Obama appeared to endorse same-sex marriage. However, that
changed when he came on the national stage. In 2004, as a candidate for the US
Senate, Obama declared that marriage was “between a man and a woman”; in the 2008
campaign, his position had moved to support for civil unions. Early in 2012, Obama
voiced support for same-sex marriage, a historic first. Putting the administration’s
lawyers where the president’s mouth was, the Obama Justice Department, in a letter by
Attorney General Eric Holder to Speaker of the House John Boehner, also announced
that it could no longer defend DOMA in court. In addition to relying on the Romer
case’s “animus” theory, the Attorney General also maintained that sexual orientation
should be treated like other invidious classifications, such as race and sex. In May 2012,
Obama made his first clear expression of support at a campaign stop in Seattle, where
he included “the freedom to love” along with tried and true elements of the American
Creed:
We came together because we believed that in America, your success shouldn’t be
determined by the circumstances of your birth. If you’re willing to work hard, you
should be able to find a good job. If you’re meeting your responsibilities, you should
be able to own a home, maybe start a business. You should be able to give your kids
the chance to do even better than you—no matter who you are, no matter where
you come from, no matter what you look like, no matter what your last name, no
matter who you love. (White House 2012, emphasis added)5
Obama was soon not alone; following his victory in the November 2012 elections,
a number of senators and representatives announced that they too had “evolved.” By
the time the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on DOMA and Proposition 8,
fifty-four senators, 180 members of the House of Representatives, fifteen governors, and
at least 117 mayors had declared themselves in favor of marriage equality.6 In roughly
5. Go to http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/10/remarks-president-campaign-event-
seattle-wa (accessed December 31, 2013). The term “no matter who you love” soon rippled across the
Internet: as of August 5, 2013, there were 150,000,000 Google “hits” for the search terms “Obama” and “no
matter who you love.”
6. This possibly incomplete, and “evolving,” list comes from Wikipedia (n.d.).
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two decades, same-sex marriage went from being a fringe cause to very mainstream. The
question is “why?”
IV. HOW AND WHY DID IT HAPPEN?
We do not have a simple answer for how and why this shift occurred. We first
summarize cultural, legal, and organizational explanations for this outcome, before
turning to our own explanation. We will argue that it was through an interactive process
of contentious politics that three factors came together to make marriage equality a
mainstream issue in US politics.
Culturally, in a society in which attitudes toward homosexuality remained largely
negative during the 1970s and 1980s (Calhoun 1999), over a short period of time,
attitudes changed sufficiently for legislatures and judges in a number of states to approve
of civil unions and marriages among LGBT couples (Yang 1997; Loftus 2001). And
although younger Americans are friendlier to same-sex marriage than are older ones,
this has not been a typical pattern of age-cohort change: studies have shown that
similar percentages of Americans of all ages have changed their minds about
homosexuality in the last two decades. Figure 1 reflects this cross-generational cultural
change in attitudes.
FIGURE 1.
Changing Attitudes About Same-Sex Marriage, by Generation
Source: The figure is reproduced from Pew Research Center Religion and Public Life Project (2012).
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During this period, there was a sharp uptick in the appearance of the terms
“same-sex marriage” and “gay marriage” in book publications, while the use of the
more traditional term “homosexual marriage” remained virtually flat (Google n.d.).
This was accompanied by the normalization of same-sex relationships in popular
culture, especially television, where gay characters were portrayed as fundamentally
no different from straight ones on sitcoms like Will and Grace, while being an out
lesbian proved no obstacle to a successful career for TV personalities like Ellen
DeGeneres.
Legally, the story of same-sex marriage in the United States is far from finished. The
Supreme Court’s rulings in Hollingsworth and Windsor have already led to new litigation
involving some of the many questions left open. It could be years before the Court holds
that all states are constitutionally obligated to recognize same-sex marriage. Nonethe-
less, the writing does appear to be on the wall. Strikingly, all three of the Court’s
gay-rights-friendly rulings—Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor—were authored, not by
down-the-line liberals, but by Justice Anthony Kennedy, a moderate conservative who
was appointed by President Reagan. So, too, it seems no accident, given the close
connection between sexual orientation discrimination and gender stereotyping, that
with one exception that was later reversed, no female justice voted against a gay rights
claim in the Supreme Court. (The exception is Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who
voted with the majority to sustain a conviction for “homosexual sodomy” in Bowers v.
Hardwick, in 1986, but she effectively reversed herself in the Lawrence case.) As the
number of women on the Court has grown, so has the Court’s receptivity to LGBT
rights claims.
Organizationally, gay and lesbian advocacy has continued to grow stronger and to
gain more resources. Not only have traditional advocacy groups taken up the cause of
LGBT rights, but new organizations like Freedom to Marry have appeared on the
scene, nourished in part by the growing acceptance of LGBT persons in public
opinion, but also by the financial clout of some sectors of the gay and lesbian com-
munity (Cummings and NeJaime 2010, 1307). While we cannot connect particular
spurts in support to particular junctures in the history of the marriage campaign, we
do find a sharp uptick in support for such advocacy groups as the Human Rights
Campaign since the middle of the 1990s. Figure 2 traces contributions to HRC from
1994 to the present.
Cultural, legal, and organizational changes were all important sources of the
progress of the same-sex marriage campaign, but they converged through the process of
what we call “contentious politics.” By this term, we mean
episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects
when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to
the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one
of the claimants. (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 5)
Roughly translated, the term refers to collective political struggle. It goes beyond the
concept of “social movements” and enables us to see the same-sex marriage controversy
as part of an interactive cycle of contention embedded in a broader political conflict
structure, in which no single actor is privileged above any other, but in which different
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actors take the initiative during different phases of the cycle.7 We do not assume that
the struggle between the cultural left and right began with DOMA, but that the conflict
between supporters and opponents of marriage equality began a new cycle of contention
initiated by the anticipatory countermobilization of the cultural right.
Not a popular issue in the activist community when the Hawaii efforts to legalize
same-sex marriage came in the early 1990s, the matter entered the national domain
indirectly through a triangular dynamic of movement/countermovement interaction.
First, in states with vigorous LGBT communities, a number of non-marriage-
related enactments were passed—enactments like the Colorado gay-friendly local anti-
discrimination ordinances that led to the antigay referendum ultimately invalidated in
Romer—which offered parts of the LGBT movement a political opportunity.
Second, these modest successes led social conservative groups to mobilize at both
the state and federal levels against the possibility of further such conquests. These
conservative groups took their campaign to the federal level to secure the passage of
DOMA. Encouraged by the swift success of DOMA and what they saw happening in
sister states, state-level conservative groups lobbied their legislatures or resorted to
referenda to adopt state constitutional amendments and laws banning same-sex mar-
riage and civil unions.
Third, spurred by the onslaught of federal and state discriminatory legislation and
constitutional enactments, increasing numbers of same-sex couples at the grassroots
7. “Contentious politics” includes social movements, as well as more institutional actors, but refers to
the processes through which these actors interact, rather than to any particular actor. The concept derives
from Charles Tilly’s work (especially Tilly 1995), and is laid out theoretically in McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly
(2001). On cycles of contention, see Koopmans (2004) and Tarrow (2011).
FIGURE 2.
Annual Total Revenue of HRC (Human Rights Campaign), 1994–2012
Note: The figures combine contributions to the Human Rights Campaign and Human Rights Campaign
Foundation.
Source: Human Rights Campaign (n.d.).
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level—some of them with substantial financial resources—began to pressure the LGBT
movement—which had previously shied away from the issue of marriage—to go to
court and to mount electoral referenda against the growing tide of legislation and
constitutional amendments privileging opposite-sex unions.
Sustained by incremental changes in public opinion, state courts and legislatures
began to recognize same-sex marriage, in turn further energizing movement supporters
and motivating opponents. An anticipatory countermobilization against change in
marriage laws and practice appeared to have triggered a mobilization by a movement for
change that had not been noticeably enthusiastic about the issue until pushed into
action by its ideological opponents and supported by unexpectedly powerful grassroots
pressure. While our research does not definitively prove or disprove this narrative, it
lends support to the importance of this triangular relationship over time.
V. OUR RESEARCH
To investigate our thesis, we conducted interviews with ten current leaders of the
LGBT movement who have been active in the movement since at least the early 1990s.
All ten were trained as lawyers, although they performed a range of functions in the
movement, including litigation, organizing, education, lobbying, and outreach. We
asked our respondents whether the movement had become more focused on same-sex
marriage over that time and why. We attempted to avoid planting our thesis in the
minds of the respondents by waiting until after each interviewee had volunteered an
explanation for the shift before seeking his or her views. We find suggestive support for
all three elements of our thesis.
Political Opportunity Structure
Although they may not use the term,8 the concept of “opportunity structure” is
familiar to every legal scholar who examines the impact of court decisions on social
movements. We have already noted three examples of how key court decisions in the
same-sex marriage story had an impact on the LGBT movement, its opponents, or both:
1. Baehr both put marriage on the agenda of a reluctant LGBT movement and “pan-
icked” the antigay right (Stone 2012, 31) into pushing to pass DOMA at the
national level and “little” DOMAs in the states.
2. Romer discouraged the right from trying to pass broadly antigay laws, leading the
countermovement to turn to the narrower ground of opposing marriage, while
encouraging the LGBT movement to believe that the courts might sustain more
gay-friendly equal protection cases.
8. The first use of the concept in legal studies goes back to Scheingold (1974). In addition, see
Cummings and NeJaime (2010), as well as Keck (2009). Studies of how legal actions reshape the political
opportunity structure can be found in the work of many scholars focusing on race. For examples, see
Brown-Nagin (2005) and Guinier (2009). The concept has also been used in studies of gender (Mayeri
2004), class (Forbath 1991; McCann 1994), and nationality (Riddell 2004).
Strange Bedfellows 461
3. Finally, in Lawrence, the Court did not endorse same-sex marriage, but by declaring
that it was no business of a state to forbid same-sex relationships between consenting
adults, Justice Kennedy gave encouragement to advocates in Massachusetts to take
same-sex marriage restrictions to court.
Our respondents pointed to a number of institutional factors they thought had
played important roles in the LGBT movement’s turn to make marriage a priority.9 All
said that the chief reason why the movement had not focused its energies on marriage
sooner was that public opinion was not ready for it. One respondent said that in the
early 1990s he did not think about the topic much. He supposed he was in favor, that
it would be “great” to achieve marriage equality but that it was “pie in the sky” and was
“not going to happen” (R4). Half pointed to the court cases in Hawaii and Vermont in
the 1990s as important catalytic events because they demonstrated that legal actions
that once seemed far-fetched had become possible winners. As one respondent said
about the Hawaii case:
In 1993 Baehr demonstrated that a court could “get it”. . . . Before bringing the x
and y cases, we looked at case law along with other political and social factors to
figure out when the right time was. (R2)
Another said:
[After Baehr] we realized that we might win in court. Baehr triggered a substantial
shift in thinking about what was possible. (R5)
And a third said:
The Hawaii case ushered in a new day as a practical matter. (R6)
But it was not only court decisions that signaled the opening of political oppor-
tunities for the movement to adopt marriage as a goal. The decision by key public
officials to open their city halls to marriage licenses for gay and lesbian couples sent
important signals to advocates in the movement. As one respondent said:
First were [San Francisco Mayor] Gavin Newsom and New Paltz Mayor Jason
West, who changed the calculus when they said they were going to do it. Andrew
Cuomo’s recent role made a great difference, less with the movement than with
the political establishment. He is a consummate political opportunist, which
makes it significant that he thinks of this as a positive opportunity for his future
presidential campaign. (R3)
Another, more cynically, observed:
9. Few argued that antimarriage sentiment in the LGBT movement was more than a marginal factor
in holding back the marriage campaign. One, in fact, did not think any activists in the movement—as
opposed to academics—were actively opposed to marriage equality (R5). However, several pointed to early
opposition to marriage and one (R7) continues to oppose marriage vigorously for principled reasons.
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The politicians were bell weathers rather than leaders. Even Gavin Newsom fits
the same pattern: When he started issuing marriage licenses in San Francisco, he
did so to shore up his left flank; now he has used that early stance to his advantage
statewide. (R4)
Anticipatory Countermobilization
This was the main thesis we brought to our research: we thought it was chiefly the
anticipatory countermobilization of opponents to gay and lesbian rights in the mid-
1990s—well before the issue of same-sex marriage became popular—that led LGBT
activists, at first hesitantly, but then more forcefully, to mobilize around the issue of
same-sex marriage. As DOMA sailed through a frightened Congress and was signed by
a president who would soon have to confront a (heterosexual) sex scandal largely of his
own making, and as conservative state legislatures were banning a practice that had not
yet become popular, supporters of LGBT rights began to turn to an issue whose time,
many feared, had not yet come. From an institution that few thought worthy of public
discussion, marriage became a “contested truth” (Rodgers 1987) at the heart of US
politics and jurisprudence.
By themselves, our interviews do not allow us to make definitive statements
about the anticipatory countermobilization hypothesis—which is why we examine
corroborative evidence in the next part—but even standing alone, the interviews were
revealing. We find it significant that a majority agreed with the anticipatory
countermobilization hypothesis, either spontaneously or after being asked about it. The
respondents fell into three groups regarding this hypothesis. Three interviewees spon-
taneously volunteered response to anticipatory countermobilization as a very important
factor in the shift. One observed:
Over time, it looked like the other side [opponents of LGBT rights] would pull
out marriage as a “trump card” and so we had been in the awkward position of
having to say that we don’t want marriage. . . . We filed in (state x) because we
felt that our opponents were coming after us. They were organizing to get a
petition for a state constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage, so we
wanted to get the case filed and decided before the amendment could occur. . . .
There were right-wingers who, by failing to work with us and refusing to
acknowledge that we had any of the rights of families, forced us to turn to the
courts. (R2)
Another said:
After 2004, the right got to the point of saying in essence that the core of the
argument for discrimination is that gay people are fundamentally different. That
view is fundamentally shallow and if you can convince people that it is wrong, you
have won half the battle. They did us a favor. . . . Once the right made constitu-
tional amendments the issue, the movement needed to fight back. They success-
fully selected the ground for us. Attacking us with constitutional amendments was
an attack on the community as much as against marriage. (R3)
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And a third commented:
Both in the 90s and after Lawrence, there was more of a push to make marriage the
central issue from the conservatives than from our side. . . . Marriage was what the
other side wanted to talk about. . . . The right was already using marriage as a scare
tactic. If we sat this fight out, that wouldn’t change the national conversation. . . .
If you want people to change their minds about a subject, first you need to get them
talking about it. The right did that. (R4)
Five other interviewees agreed, or strongly agreed, with our hypothesis once we
suggested it to them, after they had pointed to other factors. One said:
By the early 2000s, even before Lawrence, it [i.e., marriage] was just generally
accepted by nearly everyone in the movement. . . . No one wanted to be seen as
against marriage equality and thus allied with the anti-gay-rights [countermove-
ment]. (R8)
Another observed:
What changed this view was, in the mid-90s after DOMA, when the backlash
really took shape. It became clear that marriage was more than a legitimating issue.
. . . The Moral Majority anti-gay-rights movement groups existed for decades.
Their engagement with marriage started to crystallize. Right-wing anti-gay rheto-
ric increased the mobilization in the gay community. (R9)
A third opined:
Just as Anita Bryant caused gays to want to pour o.j. into the ocean, [measures
opposing same-sex marriage] made people want to rebel. Marriage was not among
the top issues in the 90s, but it has become a very popular thing to want to achieve
gay marriage. There was an effort to get marriage and it was cleverly exploited by
the right and it made every other battle harder. (R1)
And a fourth remembered:
Once we engaged with the opposition, it was on. With every political loss, it
seemed more important to keep going. The intensity around this issue has built.
Constantly ratcheted up. . . . The political losses have been highly motivating. . . .
Prop 8 galvanized the community in California and nationally. It increased
fundraising and political engagement. (R6)
The most analytical answer came from a fifth advocate, who, when asked if
conservative opposition had played a role in the LGBT movement’s taking up the
marriage issue, replied:
The biggest thing that these groups did was to make the issue much more visible.
They had more money and better organization, and by campaigning for DOMA [at
the federal level] and first state laws and then state constitutional amendments,
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they got people who previously had not thought much at all about same-sex
marriage to start thinking about it. . . . The anti-movement inspired the pro-
movement to become more active. It’s easier to get people to push back against
something awful like DOMA or the state law bans than to invest affirmatively in
seeking a right to same-sex marriage. (R10)
In contrast, two of our interviewees thought that response to anticipatory
countermobilization was not a major factor in the priority shift in the LGBT movement,
although one of them acknowledged that “any movement is dynamic” and the other
conceded that the mobilization of the religious right may have been no more than
placing a “toe on the scale” (R7). But even this respondent admitted that the conser-
vatives’ strategy of using state-ballot initiatives to restrict LGBT rights “pushed the
movement in the direction of gay marriage” (R7).
Of course, the small sample size reflects the qualitative nature of our inquiry.
Nonetheless, the results were largely supportive of our initial hypothesis. The eight
interviewees who either volunteered or agreed with our hypothesis regarding anticipa-
tory mobilization were well positioned to observe and participate in the dynamic
relationship between the LGBT rights movement and the social conservative counter-
movement during the relevant period.
Nor does our hypothesis tend to glorify the role of the LGBT leadership during the
relevant period and thus render our results suspect on grounds of self-serving recollec-
tions by our respondents. If anything, our hypothesis undercuts any such glorification,
as it portrays the LGBT leadership as charting a course in response to external oppo-
sition, rather than setting its own agenda. In fact, several respondents implicitly or
explicitly criticized the movement for its unwillingness to take up the controversial
issue of marriage sooner. For example:
The LGBT organizations were NOT in the vanguard, grassroots groups were in the
vanguard. . . . The legal groups said it was a bad idea, with the exception of a group
in Hollywood. It was grassroots groups that led the way. (R3)
Grassroots Pressure
The advantage of using an open-ended, flexible interview schedule, as we did, was
that it allowed our respondents to offer views of their own and gave us the chance to
support or reject Fetner’s hypothesis about the importance of grassroots pressure on
LGBT movement organizations (2008, 112). It was only in the course of our interviews
that spontaneously offered opinions by a number of our respondents made us more
aware of the role of ordinary gay and lesbian citizens that Fetner highlighted in her
research. A large proportion of respondents spontaneously stated that even before
same-sex marriage was widely regarded as a realistic possibility, LGBT rights organiza-
tions were approached by gay and lesbian couples seeking help in securing a right to
marry. As one respondent said:
In the early 90s, it began to change. At the end of the day it’s about the people and
people were lining up to get their licenses. . . . It was like people lining up for grain
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at silos. Once the people rise up, forget about institutions. The minute those lines
started happening, I got convinced. You can’t imagine the consternation in the
Democratic Party when SF gay couples started lining up for marriages. . . . It was
from the people, it was a populist movement. As people started coming out in large
numbers, it was like a revolution. Then they wanted to couple, then they wanted
to have kids, file joint tax returns and have the state say yes. (R1)
A second observed:
The experience of living with AIDS and then with more and more gay and lesbian
couples raising families brought home to more people the importance of recogni-
tion for family rights. That led to pressure from the grass roots as well as from the
top. (R2)
And a third remembered:
Prop 8 made people angry and upset. They got involved. It definitely led to more
donations. (R6)
How did the LGBT organizations respond to this grassroots pressure? Faced with
the delicacy of the marriage issue, we learned that they at first routinely told such
couples that the law could not help: For example, one advocate said that callers were
told that the prohibition on marriage was unfair and frustrating but that there was no
realistic possibility of winning a case seeking a legal right to same-sex marriage. Indeed,
bringing such a case could be counterproductive if it led to bad rulings that would then
have precedential effect. “When these constituents learned that we couldn’t help,” this
respondent concluded, “some of them got angry” (R6).
But our respondents also stressed that the continuing pressure from same-sex
couples seeking to marry made LGBT groups attentive to any changes in the legal,
political, or social climate that might make lobbying, litigation, or other activism
around marriage potentially successful. Meanwhile, they were facing an opponent—the
coalition of socially conservative groups—that was forcing the issue onto referenda and
initiatives in state after state (Stone 2012, 10–12). Two interviewees noted that same-
sex marriage provided fund-raising opportunities, but the donations from supporters of
same-sex marriage appear to have ripened only after the movement had come to
embrace the goal of legal same-sex marriage.
As a result of our interviews, we concluded that pressure from the grassroots, at
least partly triggered by the aggressive campaigns from the movement’s opponents, was
an important link between the organized LGBT movement’s original reluctance to raise
same-sex marriage as an issue and its decision to take it up as a major campaign cause.
VI. DISCUSSION
The interviews we conducted for this study provide a window on what was
happening within the LGBT rights movement from the mid-1990s through 2012 but,
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as noted above, they do not enable us to make a definitive assessment of our hypotheses
regarding the LGBT movement’s priority shift to support marriage equality. What we
can say with confidence is, first, that friendly court decisions and dramatic support by
highly visible politicians offered the movement the political opportunity to move
toward marriage. Second, the interviews gave us confidence in our hypothesis regarding
anticipatory countermobilization from the right leading to greater support for marriage
in the LGBT movement. And, third, a grassroots cohort was at least partly responsible
for the movement’s adoption of marriage equality as a goal.
We are comforted in our conclusions by research by other scholars that resonates
with our results. We have already cited the path-breaking work of Tina Fetner, which
helped inspire our work. Recent studies by Amy Stone and by Verta Taylor and her
collaborators also show how the repertoire of the LGBT movement was expanded in its
response to anticipatory countermobilization.
From the Courts to the Ballot
In her systematic study of religious right ballot initiatives, Stone (2012) offers
evidence that the LGBT movement initially found itself at a deep financial and popular
disadvantage when facing the well-financed and professionalized campaigns against
LGBT rights from the right. This imbalance both led to serious reversals in many state
and local campaigns and forced the movement to divert financial and personnel
resources to election campaigns that might have been used in other venues. “Between
1974 and 2009,” writes Stone, “the Religious Right placed 146 anti-gay ballot measures
on the ballot, using direct democracy to successfully fight LGBT legislative gains on
both the state and local level” (2012, xv; see also Stone 2013).
In responding to this onslaught of ballot measures, LGBT organizations developed
a set of tactics such as disciplined political messaging, preballot legal challenges, pro-
fessional polling, voter identification by volunteers, and getting out the vote. “The
campaign tactics make it possible for local community groups to evolve into effective
professional campaigns, devoted to a win on election day and a victory against the
Religious Right” (Stone 2012, xx). In findings that are strikingly resonant with
McAdam’s (1983) findings about movement/countermovement interaction in the
struggle for racial equality, each time the countermovement escalated its tactics, the
new tactics became more dominant (Stone 2012, xxiii). If we can infer a conclusion
from Stone’s work, it would be that the LGBT movement’s response to the counter-
movement’s ballot campaigns was not only to devote its attention to the issues its
opponents had raised—increasingly, same-sex marriage—but to learn how to combat
these initiatives on a terrain—election ballots—it had not chosen.
Same-Sex Wedding Protests
These campaigns were mostly run at the local level, which brings us to a second
strand of research that we think supports our findings: that experience in combating the
attacks of the countermovement helped spur and consolidate a grassroots movement on
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behalf of marriage on the part of gay and lesbian couples. The research of Verta Taylor
and her collaborators shows that an unusual form of public performance—the “same-sex
wedding protest”—accompanied Gavin Newsom’s decision to grant marriage licenses in
California (Taylor et al. 2009). Based on far more systematic interviewing and surveys
than we have attempted, these scholars report two salient results about grassroots
activism following countermovement mobilization in California.
First, nearly half their respondents who participated in the same-sex wedding
protests in San Francisco reported that “after their marriages were invalidated, they
channeled their activism away from other causes, such as LGBT and women’s rights
activism, into the marriage equality movement to defend the legality of the San
Francisco marriages in the face of anti-gay opposition” (883). Second, in addition to
redirecting activism in San Francisco to marriage, the initial marriage protest ignited a
state-wide campaign for marriage equality in California.
Other researchers’ work is now becoming publicly available (see, e.g., Bernstein
and Taylor 2013). But we are encouraged that the research by Stone and by Taylor and
her collaborators triangulates with our own findings to suggest how political opportu-
nities, movement/countermovement interaction, and grassroots activism combined in
mobilizing the LGBT movement to fight for marriage equality.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We first developed our central hypothesis about the importance of anticipatory
countermobilization from unsystematic observations during the two-decade period from
the early 1990s to 2012. Our interviews provided substantial external confirmation of
the importance of this phenomenon, although they also pointed to other important
factors. Our interviews also prompted us to draw a number of inferences.
First, we note the importance of the legalization of American cultural life.
Although such factors as increasingly positive portrayals of LGBT Americans in film
and television no doubt played an important role in the shifting attitudes of Ameri-
cans, activists themselves reported responding to judicial decisions that demonstrated
what was possible. A court operates as a “forum of principle” (Dworkin 1981, 516–18)
in which split-the-difference compromises such as civil unions may prove unsustain-
able over the long run. Thus the courts first held out the possibility of a home run
like Roe v. Wade and then when they delivered partial victories—as in the Hawaii
and Vermont cases—they encouraged both sides to redouble their efforts. But
whether winning in court, losing in court, or doing a little of both, US social
movement activists may be tempted to frame their broader argument in terms of
principles that beget the articulation of counterprinciples, rather than as pragmatic
compromises.
The US tendency toward legalization of political conflict coexists with the frac-
tured nature of legal authority that we noted in Part III. We would hazard a guess that
together, the two phenomena tend to increase the frequency, duration, and intensity of
movement/countermovement tangos. At the very least, the ability of the LGBT move-
ment to leverage success in court into success in more popular fora undercuts the sort of
claims made by strong critics of litigation-focused reform strategies (Rosenberg 2008).
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Court victories not only can serve as catalysts for political achievements (Greenberg
1968, 1522); they can also set in motion interactions among both elites and grassroots
players in movements and countermovements that lead to legal and practical change.
All these dynamics appear to have been in play in the legal struggle for LGBT rights
(Keck 2009; Cummings and NeJaime 2010, 1329–30).
Second, our interviews supported the conclusion that same-sex marriage has come
to stand for the LGBT rights movement as a whole. That would have been surprising to
most LGBT activists two decades ago—and it dismays some such activists even today
(see the debate in Bernstein and Taylor 2013)—but in retrospect it is hardly surprising.
Social conservatives placed same-sex marriage on the public agenda in order to mobilize
those Americans who were at most willing to tolerate LGBT Americans against the
implications of full equality (Dorf 2011). Once formulated in those terms, the LGBT
movement could not realistically choose to sit on the sidelines.
Third, our confirmation of the important, though not exclusive, role that antici-
patory countermobilization played in leading the LGBT rights movement to champion
same-sex marriage led us to wonder whether sociological accounts of movement/
countermovement dynamics ought to be revised to include the dynamics of anticipatory
countermobilization. At the least, this could be a fertile field for comparative research.
We would guess that evidence of anticipatory countermobilization would most likely be
found in movements concerning social issues, broadly defined, because such issues tend,
by their nature, to be polarizing. For example:
• Did segregationists’ invocation of miscegenation spur civil rights activists to
embrace interracial marriage at an earlier point than might otherwise have been
expected?
• Did the pro-life movement’s efforts to ban so-called partial-birth abortion lead the
pro-choice movement to define the targeted procedures as within the ambit of the
abortion right it sought to protect?
• Has the gun rights movement in the United States been led to adopt ever-more
absolutist positions by the gun-control countermovement’s backing of measures such
as waiting periods and an assault weapons ban?
We do not wish to prejudge the answers to these and other questions. Anticipatory
countermobilization can lead a movement to rally around the cause that the counter-
movement attacks in anticipation, but it also can lead movement leaders to distinguish
their cause from the one under attack. For example, the modesty of the US labor
movement in the post–World War II United States relative to Europe’s can be under-
stood as partly a reaction against the strength of US anticommunism: rather than
embrace a radical agenda, labor leaders were often at pains to renounce one (Fordham
1998, 133). Likewise, when opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment warned that it
would lead to women being drafted into the military, some women’s rights activists
responded by distancing themselves from that position, rather than embracing it
(Mansbridge 1986, 62).
Finally, we hope that our suggestive finding that grassroots pressure was at least
partly responsible for nudging the LGBT movement to support marriage rights will
encourage social movement scholars and legal scholars to examine the movement/
countermovement logic to include vertical relations within movements.
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